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Privacy vs. Practicality:
Should Alaska Adopt
the Leon Good Faith Exception?
I. INTRODUCTION
In JR.N. v. State,' the Alaska Court of Appeals rejected the
state's argument that a police officer's good faith violation of a
statute does not trigger the exclusionary rule.2 The Alaska
Supreme Court has requested supplemental briefing on the good
faith issue,3 specifically on whether Alaska should adopt the good
faith exception as articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Leon.' While the facts of JR.N. do not support
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1. 809 P.2d 416 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
2. Id. at 420-21. In J.R.N., police officers obtained a custodial confession from
a minor in violation of Delinquency Rule 7(b). Under Alaska Rule of Evidence
412, such evidence is normally excluded: "Evidence illegally obtained shall not be
used over proper objection by the defendant in a criminal prosecution for any
purpose .... ." ALASKA R. EVID. 412. In violating the statute, however, the
arresting officer had relied, allegedly in good faith, on erroneous advice from the
district attorney's office.
3. Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Good Faith Exception
to Exclusionary Rule at 1, State v. J.R.N. (No. S-4528). The court posed three
questions: (1) "Should a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule be adopted?";
(2)"Should any distinction be drawn between violations of constitutional, as
opposed to statutory or rule provisions, in fashioning a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule?"; and (3) "What is the applicable good faith standard, one that
is objective, subjective, objectively reasonable - or a combination of objective and
subjective standards?" Id. at 1-2.
4. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon involved the execution of a search warrant that
appeared valid on its face, but was actually unsupported by probable cause. In
holding the sanction of exclusion too "extreme," the United States Supreme Court
determined that the officers' good faith reliance on the judgment of a detached,
neutral magistrate to be objectively reasonable. Id. at 926.
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such a broad query,5 the Leon exception is of pressing concern to
state courts throughout the country and must be addressed in
Alaska.6
Over the past two decades, the United States Supreme Court
has limited the rights of victims of illegal searches and seizures. The
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, once hailed as a personal
constitutional right, has been relegated to the status of a "judicially
created remedy."7 Consequently, the triggering of the rule is no
longer automatic but is contingent upon the outcome of a cost-
benefit analysis.' One result of this demotion from right to remedy
5. In J.R.N., it is undisputed that the police had probable cause to arrest the
defendant. The good faith issue in J.R.N., therefore, was not the more difficult
Leon question of whether the results of an illegal search, conducted in good faith
reliance on a warrant unsupported by probable cause, should be excluded, but
rather the narrower question of whether a good faith violation of a statute warrants
exclusion. In the latter inquiry, no constitutional right is implicated. It would
therefore be inappropriate for the Alaska Supreme Court to adopt the Leon
exception based on the facts of JR.N.
6. State courts are currently split on whether to adopt Leon. See infra note
19.
7. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974). In Calandra, the Court
said that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is "not to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim" but "to deter future unlawful police conduct." Id. at
347. The Court's conclusion that exclusion was merely "a judicially created
remedy," id. at 348, resolved the dispute over the rule's constitutional basis and
separated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule from its Fifth Amendment
counterpart, thereby dismantling earlier holdings that had linked the two. See
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1365, 1372-77, 1390 (1983) (noting that early cases such as Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), had
transposed the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule into the Fourth Amendment,
rendering exclusion in search-and-seizure cases a constitutional right).
Calandra is not inconsistent with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which
applied the exclusionary rule to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Mapp Court had found the exclusionary rule to be constitutionally required,
but was unclear about its source. Stewart, supra, at 1380. Three interpretations of
Mapp have been proposed: "[1] exclusion mandated directly by the Constitution,
[2] exclusion to preserve the integrity of the government, and [3] exclusion as a
constitutionally required remedy." Id. Calandra adopted the third.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (reasoning that
because exclusion is distinct from the rights violated by an unlawful search, the
propriety of exclusion in a given circumstance "must be resolved by weighing the
costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of
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and its attendant cost-benefit scrutiny is the Leon good faith
exception.
In United States v. Leon,9 the United States Supreme Court
held that a police officer's good faith reliance on a facially valid,
albeit constitutionally unsound, search warrant did not trigger the
exclusionary rule, despite the Fourth Amendment's requirement that
no warrants - and thus no searches - can issue except upon
probable cause. ° The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule,
the Court reasoned, was to deter future police misconduct." The
Court concluded, therefore, that since an officer relying in good
faith on a facially valid warrant could not be deterred by exclusion,
the "benefits" of exclusion in such a case are "marginal or non-
existent" while the costs to society remain unbearably high. 2
Some state courts have attacked Leon's specific cost-benefit
analysis without disturbing Leon's fundamental assumption that
deterrence is the primary justification for exclusion. 3  Other
courts, however, have rejected Leon on more theoretical grounds.
Specifically, some state courts have concluded that because the
strong right to privacy implicit in their state constitutions directly
inherently trustworthy tangible evidence"). Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969), was the first case to suggest that a cost-benefit analysis was the proper
method of gauging the propriety of exclusion in a given circumstance. See id. at
174-75. Alaska has also subjected its exclusionary rule to cost-benefit scrutiny,
suggesting to some that exclusion in Alaska is not a constitutional right. See, e.g.,
State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976).
9. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
10. Id. at 926.
11. Id. at 906.
12. Id. at 922.
13. E.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990). The Marsala court made
two observations. First, the exclusionary rule does have a deterrent function even
when an officer relies in good faith on a facially valid but constitutionally defective
warrant. The exclusionary rule is not only directed at police misconduct, but also
at the "warrant-issuing process" and may be the only way to induce judges to
scrutinize warrant applications. Exclusion will also encourage officers to use more
than reasonable care in applying for warrants. Id. at 66.
Second, the costs of exclusion, where an officer acts in good faith, are not
substantial. In weighing the costs, the Leon Court considered the "aggregated costs
of exclusion in all cases" without distinguishing the percentage of releases that
applied to good faith error - figures which are even less substantial. Id. at 64-65.
Therefore, according to the Court, although the exclusionary rule exacts some cost
from society, "this 'cost' is not sufficiently 'substantial' to overcome the benefits"
of exclusion. Id. at 65.
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clashes with a good faith exception, they must afford their citizens
greater protection than the United States Supreme Court provides
in the federal context. 4 This note will examine the propriety of
adopting a good faith exception in Alaska in light of the express
right to privacy guaranteed by Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska
Constitution: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed."15
In concluding that deterrence is the sole purpose of the
exclusionary rule, the Leon Court rejected the possibility that
exclusion could redress the privacy violation suffered by the search
victim. The Court observed that the suppression of illegally
obtained evidence often sets otherwise guilty defendants free,
thereby rendering a windfall on some search victims and undermin-
ing the foundations of the criminal justice system. 6 The Court will
tolerate such a windfall only when exclusion can have a deterrent
effect, suggesting that individual privacy rights are subordinate to
the demands of judicial expediency. Yet in Alaska, and in other
states where a premium is placed on individual privacy rights,
vindicating the privacy violation in the form of exclusion does not
constitute a windfall - for the costs of suppression are, in the words
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, "tolerable not because they
are slight but because the constitutional values thereby safeguarded
are so precious."' 7 This compensatory function is an additional
benefit to exclusion that shifts the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis
against a good faith exception even where, as in the case of good
faith error, the rule's deterrent function is minimal.'
14. E.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); see also Yale
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather Than an 'Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983). In
Leon, the Court divorced the exclusionary rule from the privacy violation resulting
from the unlawful search, observing that "the use of fruits of a past unlawful search
or seizure 'work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 906
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
15. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22. For a good discussion of the general
arguments against Leon, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE - A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 1.2(a)-1.3(g) (2d ed. 1987).
16. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08.
17. See State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 560-61 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting Leon on
the ground that the good faith exception compromises judicial integrity, and noting
that "the basis of our exclusionary rule is not suited to such simplistic resolution of
the issue," that is, through a straight deterrence-based cost-benefit analysis).
18. This argument does not require the rejection of State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907
(Alaska 1976), which held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to parole
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In addition to providing a theoretical analysis, this note will
show that on a practical level, the adoption of Leon could under-
mine Alaska's privacy right by frustrating the warrant-issuing
process. The good faith exception will divert the focus of appellate
review from assessing probable cause to finding good faith and
consequently will leave questionable probable cause determinations
unchecked. The probable cause standard will weaken for want of
proper appellate supervision, while deficient warrants will gain
legitimacy once executed in good faith. The cumulative effect will
likely be an increase in privacy invasions unsupported by probable
cause - a result which a judiciary having pledged to uphold Article
I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution must not sanction. The
good faith exception as espoused in Leon v. United States, therefore,
is irreconcilable with Alaska's privacy provision and must be
rejected."
II. LEON'S MINIMIZATION OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT
The Leon holding contains little more than bare assertions as
to the origin and purposes of the exclusionary rule. Justice
Brennan, in his dissent, likened the Leon majority to a group of
magicians, noting how it had made the benefits of the exclusionary
revocation hearings, or Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983), which held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply to sentencing hearings. Rather, the premium
Alaska places on individual privacy is fully implicated only when evidence is used
to prove guilt at a criminal trial; only a judgment of "guilty" can displace the right
to life, liberty and property. See Sears, 553 P.2d at 915 (noting that Alaska's
exclusionary rule "works, at a minimum, to bar the use of illegally obtained evi-
dence for the purpose of directly proving guilt") (Connor, J., dissenting). Post-
conviction hearings are merely incidental to a guilty verdict and therefore do not
sufficiently implicate privacy rights to offset the costs of exclusion where the
deterrent value is minimal.
19. Rejection would be a respectable position as several states have done so.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); State v. Oakes, 598
A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991); State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990); State v. Carter,
370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); Stringer
v. State, 491 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1986); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985).
Although many state courts have adopted the good faith exception, their
constitutions do not contain analogous provisions to Alaska's specific guarantee of
the right to privacy. See Roger S. Hanson, The Aftermath of Illinois v. Gates and
United States v. Leon: A Comprehensive Evaluation of Their Impact Upon the
Litigation of Search Warrant Validity, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 393, 516-522 (1988).
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rule disappear "with a mere wave of the hand."2 In its strongest
argument, the Court reasoned that exclusion could not be used to
redress the privacy violation because indiscriminate use of the rule
would undermine the criminal justice system by setting guilty
defendants free.2' In the Court's view, this benefit to the search
victim far outweighs the harm resulting from the privacy violation,
and thus must be limited to situations where exclusion can have a
deterrent effect.' This reasoning, however, is persuasive only in
a society or jurisdiction that places little value on individual privacy
rights, for only in such a society can the demands of judicial
expediency justify privacy violations. As the Supreme Court itself
has stated, "'[t]he efforts of the courts ... to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice"' of individual rights.'
The Leon holding turned on the proposition that the exclusion-
ary rule serves solely to deter future police misconduct.2 4 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied primarily on United States
v. Calandra' for the assertion that the "wrong condemned" by the
Fourth Amendment is the "unjustified governmental invasion" into
the "privacy of one's person, house, papers or effects."'26 In the
words of the Calandra Court, "[t]hat wrong... is fully accomplished
by the original search without probable cause."'27 Therefore, the
use of such tainted evidence at trial, the Leon Court reasoned, does
20. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 908.
22. Id.
23. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914), quoted in Leon, 468
U.S. at 936 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 906.
25. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
26. Id. at 354; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. The issue in Calandra was
whether to apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury hearings, a question that the
Court had previously answered in the affirmative in Silverthome Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Calandra Court, however, distinguished
Silverthorne on the ground that the Silverthorne holding was actually directed
toward preventing the use of the tainted evidence at trial. The Court observed that
"[i]t did not appear [in Silverthorne] that the grand jury needed the documents to
perform its investigative or accusatorial functions .... [T]he primary consequence
of the [Silverthorne] Court's decision was to exclude the evidence from the
subsequent criminal trial." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 352 n.8. The Court concluded,
therefore, that Silverthorne did not control. Id. at 353 n.8.
27. Calandra, 414 U.S at 354.
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not implicate the Fourth Amendment." The Leon Court conclud-
ed that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right,
but a judicially created remedy designed to deter future police
misconduct.29 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the
Fourth Amendment contains no express provision mandating the
exclusion of evidence that violates its commands."
While the Court's argument may seem plausible, it is not an
"honest assessment of the merits of the exclusionary rule."'"
Because "seizures are executed principally to secure evidence" for
criminal trials, "the admission of illegally obtained evidence
implicates the same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of
that evidence."'32 As Justice Brennan argued in his Leon dissent,
the "artificial line" drawn by the Court "rests ultimately on an
impoverished understanding of judicial responsibility in our
constitutional scheme," for the "right to be free from the initial
invasion of privacy and the right of exclusion are coordinate
components of the central embracing right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. '
28. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
29. Id.
30. Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Justice Brennan beginning his dissenting opinion by
acknowledging the strengths of the majority's position) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
But see Kamisar, supra note 14, at 581 (noting that although there is no express
provision in the Fourth Amendment mandating the exclusion of improperly seized
evidence, much of our constitutional doctrine has been the product of judicial
implication).
31. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 935 (Brennan, I., dissenting). The Calandra Court cited Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), as authority for its conclusion that the
exclusionary rule's sole function is deterrence. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48. On
the contrary, dissenting in Leon, Justice Brennan argued that in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), decided one year after Elkins, "such a narrow conception of the
rule" had "forever [been] put to rest." Leon, 468 U.S. at 931 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Mapp, in fact, was unclear as to the purpose of the exclusionary rule.
Writing for the Mapp plurality, Justice Clark at one point stated that the rule is "a
clear, specific, and constitutionally required - even if judicially implied -
deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would
have been reduced to a form of words." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
Despite this language, many commentators suggest that deterrence was not
the driving force behind Justice Clark's opinion. Professor Kamisar suggests that
Justice Clark, in seeking to overrule Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (which
refused to impose the exclusionary rule on the states), felt compelled to advance
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The Leon Court's reliance on Calandra is also questionable, for
the Calandra Court's analysis that deterrence is the sole function of
the exclusionary rule was incomplete. The Calandra Court began
its discussion with the premise that the "purpose of the exclusionary
rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search
victim."'  As authority for this proposition, the Court cited the
following observation made, in passing, by the Court in Linkletter v.
Walker." "'[Tihe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects
cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late."'36
The Calandra Court, however, misconstrued Linkletter; the
words "redress" and "restore" are not synonymous. "Restore"
refers to making something whole again, while "redress" is defined
as making amends or giving "satisfaction for an injury."37 Thus,
while Linkletter properly recognized that the exclusionary rule
cannot cure the privacy violation,38 the Calandra Court improperly
held that the exclusionary rule could not redress the wrong suffered
by the search victim.39 Calandra's conclusion that the rule plays
.as many reasons for the exclusionary rule as he could find, whether constitutional
or pragmatic." Kamisar, supra note 14, at 622-23. See also Stephen K. Schlesinger
& Bradford Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule in
Search of a Rationale, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 225, 235-36 (1980), for the following
explanation of Wolf.
The only reason Justice Clark engaged in that factual discussion was that
he read Wolf to be "bottomed on factual considerations," as opposed to
constitutional analysis ... and out of respect for the precedent he was
overturning, he felt obliged to meet and defeat it on its own grounds first,
before moving to the basis of his own position.
Indeed, the fact that the Mapp Court imposed the exclusionary rule on the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the rule has some constitutional
lineage. One thing, however, is certain: the deterrence rationale has arrived only
of late. It appeared for the first time in Wolf - 35 years after the United States
Supreme Court had declared the exclusionary rule to be mandated by the
Fourteenth Amendment in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Kamisar,
supra note 14, at 598.
34. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347.
35. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
36. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637).
37. BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 1279 (6th ed. 1990).
38. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). The
Leon Court cited Stone for the proposition that the rule was "neither intended nor
able to 'cure' the privacy violation. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
39. Some courts and commentators have suggested that the exclusionary rule
is not well suited to compensate the search victim, recognizing that many privacy
violations go unanswered where prosecution is not pursued. Terry v. Ohio, 392
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only a deterrent function, therefore, is inaccurate, for the possibility
that the rule could compensate the search victim was never properly
addressed.
In Commonwealth v. Edmunds,' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted the Calandra holding with disapproval.' While
tracing the evolution of the exclusionary rule, the Edmunds court
observed that during the early 1970's, the United States Supreme
Court "began moving towards a metamorphosed view, suggesting
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is not to redress the injury
to the privacy of the search victim (but, rather) to deter future
unlawful police conduct."'4  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
refused to follow the path of the United States Supreme Court on
the ground that Calandra was inconsistent with the strong right to
privacy inherent in the Pennsylvania Constitution.43
Indeed, only by minimizing the value of the individual privacy
right does the Leon cost-benefit analysis weigh in favor of a good
faith exception. For it is only in this "curious world" where the
liberty and privacy "benefits" of the exclusionary rule "are made to
disappear with a mere wave of the hand" that exclusion, in the
absence of any deterrent function, brings a windfall to a search
victim.4  The Leon Court rejected the possibility that the rule
could play a compensatory role when it observed that "the magni-
tude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants [by the
suppression of illegally obtained evidence] offends basic concepts of
the criminal justice system."'45 The majority agreed to tolerate such
U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (stating that the exclusionary rule "is powerless to deter invasions
of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving
some other goal"); see also LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 1.2(a). But this criticism
"does not suggest that the rule is not a necessary remedy, only that it is not a
sufficient one." Stewart, supra note 7, at 1396. Non-actionable invasions of privacy
by the state occur continuously in a modem society; it is only when the state seeks
to strip an individual of her personal liberty by way of such an invasion that a
constitutional remedy is necessary.
40. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
41. Id. at 897-98. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 898 (alteration and emphasis added by the Edmunds court) (quoting
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347).
43. Id. at 899, 905-06.
44. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 908 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976)). The Leon
Court was referencing the following quote by Justice Powell in the Stone decision:
"The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer
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a windfall only when exclusion, as determined on a case-by-case
basis, could also deter future police misconduct. Under Leon,
therefore, no personal constitutional remedy exists for the victim of
an illegal search.'
The Alaska Constitution must not sanction such a result,
particularly since no workable alternative to the exclusionary rule
exists.47 The express right to privacy guaranteed by the Alaska
Constitution' s has been recognized as fundamental to Alaskan life,
affording Alaskans "a measure of control over their own [lives]
which is... virtually unattainable" in other states.49 In a jurisdic-
tion that places a premium on individual privacy, such as Alaska,
exclusion can serve a compensatory function without rendering a
windfall on the search victim. Therefore, even where the deterrent
value of exclusion is minimal, as in the case of good faith reliance
on a facially valid but defective warrant, the importance of vindicat-
ing the aggrieved party's privacy rights can justify the costs of
exclusion.
and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary
to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice." Stone, 428
U.S. at 490. But cf. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1970)
("The American constitutional theory is that constitutions are a restraining force
against the abuse of governmental power, not that individual rights are a matter of
governmental sufferance.").
46. Leon, 4-68 U.S. at 906. The Leon Court opined that the exclusionary rule
"thus operates as a 'judicially created remedy' designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Calandra,
414 U.S. at 348).
47. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1398-1400 (discussing the inadequacies of various
proposals to modify the exclusionary rule, including a good faith exception); see
also Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 935-36 (1986) (observing
that Leon creates the oddity of an admitted constitutional violation that has no
remedy at law); David Clark Esseks, Errors in Good Faith: The Leon Exception Six
Years Later, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 625, 631 n.46 (1990).
48. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed.").
49. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503-04 (Alaska 1975); see also State v. Glass,
583 P.2d 872, 878-79 (Alaska 1978), modified on other grounds by City & Borough
of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129 n.8 (Alaska 1984) (holding that Alaska's
privacy amendment affords broader protection than the penumbra of privacy rights
granted under the United States Constitution).
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III. A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE COMPENSATORY
FUNCrION OF EXCLUSION
A. Privacy Protection in Alaska
The Leon Court's conclusion that exclusion is a constitutionally
required remedy does not necessarily mean that the search victim
has no related rights; a remedy "is a right.., in the sense that every
remedy vests a right in those who may claim it."' 50 The question
therefore becomes: "Who may claim the remedy?" Under Leon, the
victim of an illegal search may claim the remedy for the sake of
society, that is, to serve the general purpose of deterrence, but not
for the victim's own sake. In Alaska, however, where the state
constitution expressly recognizes individual privacy rights, exclusion
should be treated as a constitutionally required remedy claimable by
all victims of searches at the moment the fruits of an unlawful
privacy invasion are sought to be used at trial. Such a conclusion is
implicit in the Alaska Constitution and Alaska common law - both
of which would be frustrated by the adoption of a good faith
exception.
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that it is "not bound
by the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment in expounding the corresponding section of the Alaska
Constitution's Declaration of Rights, [A]rticle I, [S]ection 14." 51
Indeed, the Alaska Supreme Court is "under a duty.., to develop
additional constitutional rights and privileges under [the] Alaska
Constitution if [it] find[s] such fundamental rights and privileges to
be within the intention and spirit of [the] local constitutional
language." 52
50. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1384.
51. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127,139 (Alaska 1971); see also Roberts v. State,
458 P.2d 340,342 (Alaska 1969) ("To look only to the United States Supreme Court
for constitutional guidance would be an abdication by this court of its constitutional
responsibilities."). Article I, Section 14 of Alaska's Declaration of Rights reads:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other property,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.. . ." ALASKA CONST.
art I, § 14. But for the phrase "and other property," Article I, Section 14 is
identical to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S.
CON5T. amend. IV.
52. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970); see also
Roberts, 458 P.2d at 342.
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Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, which expressly
guarantees the right to privacy, has been interpreted as providing a
greater right to privacy than that afforded by the penumbra of
privacy rights under the federal constitution.53 The fundamental
importance of the right to privacy to the Alaska citizenry must not
be underestimated. In Ravin v. State,' the Alaska Supreme Court
explained:
The privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution was intended
to give recognition and protection to the home. Such a reading
is consonant with the character of life in Alaska. Our territory
and now state has traditionally been the home of people who
prize their individuality and who have chosen to settle or to
continue living here in order to achieve a measure of control
over their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in
many of our sister states.55
As a result of this "more extensive right of privacy," Alaska's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures "is broader in
scope than Fourth Amendment guarantees under the United States
Constitution."56
B. Alaska's Departures from Federal Law
The privacy amendment has provided the basis for Alaska's
rejection of many of the United States Supreme Court's search-and-
seizure decisions. For example, in State v. Jones,7 the Alaska
Supreme Court rejected the Illinois v. Gates58 "totality of the
circumstances" test for determining the existence of probable
cause.59 In Gates, the United States Supreme Court replaced the
Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test for probable cause ° with the
53. Glass, 583 P.2d at 878-79. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
55. Id. at 503-04. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
56. State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317,324 (Alaska 1985). But see Weltin v. State, 574
P.2d 816, 821 n.15 (Alaska 1978) (holding that under the particular circumstances
of that case, where officers conducted a warrantless search for weapons incident to
a lawful arrest, the protections of Alaska's privacy amendment "do not add to the
privacy protections provided by Article I, Section 14" of the Alaska Constitution).
57. 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985).
58. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
59. Jones, 706 P.2d at 322-24.
60. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964). The Aguilar-Spinelli test required that an affidavit establish both the
informant's basis of knowledge and his veracity. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 228-30.
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more flexible "totality of the circumstances" standard.6' The Gates
Court noted that probable cause determinations are "'factual and
practical considerations of everyday life"'62 that are not suited to
the "rigid compartmentalization" of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli
test.' Under the "totality of the circumstances" test, therefore, the
"task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances,"
probable cause exists.' Clearly, Gates made it easier for police to
secure search warrants in close cases. The Alaska Supreme Court,
however, refused to follow Gates, concluding that "the Gates totality
of the circumstances approach does not provide the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures required by
Article I, Section 14 and Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution."
'
61. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
62. Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
63. Id. at 231 n.6.
64. Id. at 238.
65. State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317,324 (Alaska 1985). In reaching this conclusion,
the court was persuaded, in part, by Justice Brennan's dissent in Gates defending
Aguilar-Spinelli. Id. at 322; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 284-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Alaska Supreme Court refused to follow two other significant search-
and-seizure decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court. In an
earlier case, Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d 390 (Alaska 1973), the Alaska Supreme
Court rejected the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1971), which had held that a warrant application need
not state with specificity the basis of the informant's credibility. In Harrelson, the
Alaska Supreme Court wrote: "In order to prevent groundless searches based on
wholly unreliable information from being inflicted on the citizens of this State, we
shall continue to insist that the circumstances that would justify a magistrate in
crediting an informant's statements shall be set out with specificity in the affidavit."
Harrelson, 516 P.2d at 394-95.
In another departure from federal law, in Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40
(Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court limited the rule adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry held that "where
a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
... that criminal activity may be afoot," the officer may briefly stop the suspect
and, if there is reason to believe the suspect may be armed, "conduct a carefully
limited search" to discover such weapons. Id. at 30. The Alaska court confined
Terry to situations where "the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that
imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently
occurred." Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 (emphasis added); see also Ozenna v. State,
619 P.2d 477, 479 (Alaska 1980) (recognizing the "imminent public danger"
requirement to be a limit on Terry). The court reasoned that only in situations of
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Alaska's refusal to follow Gates signifies a rejection of the
"practical" and "common sense" approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence utilized by the Supreme Court.' In Leon, the
majority based its decision primarily on an expediency rationale
made possible by its characterization of the exclusionary rule as a
deterrent safeguard, rather than a constitutional right. Alaska has
yet to be "lured by the temptations of expediency"'67 in its analysis
of constitutional rights." Thus, Alaska courts must not blindly
follow, and indeed must take a critical look at, Leon.
Like the United States Supreme Court in Leon, Alaska has
framed its discussion of the exclusionary rule in cost-benefit terms,
suggesting that it too perceives exclusion to be a remedy, not a
personal constitutional right.69 Yet, it is also evident that the
privacy amendment has influenced the Alaska Supreme Court's
analysis of the exclusionary rule. In its discussions of the rule, the
Alaska Supreme Court has intimated that exclusion is directly
connected to the personal constitutional rights of the search victim
- a connection that was expressly rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Leon."
"imminent public danger" was a balance struck between a person's privacy interest
and society's need for effective law enforcement. See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46-47
(quoting People v. Mickelson, 380 P.2d 658, 660 (Cal. 1963)).
66. See Harris, 403 U.S. at 577 (citation omitted).
67. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. In Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970), the Alaska
Supreme Court rejected the expediency arguments utilized by the United States
Supreme Court to limit the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (noting that Congress had determined that a
sentence of 90 days in jail "is not too great to be summarily administered"). The
Baker court concluded that, under the Alaska Constitution, the right to a jury
applies to all criminal proceedings. Baker, 471 P.2d at 394-95, 401. As noted by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Baker. "The argument from expediency contains
inherent defects .... To allow expediency to be the basic principle would place
the individual constitutional right in a secondary position, to be effectuated only if
it accorded with expediency." Id. at 394.
69. See, e.g., J.R.N. v. State, 809 P.2d 416, 420-21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)
(excluding juvenile's confession based on police failure to notify parents of arrest
pursuant to Delinquency Rule 7(b)); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976)
(holding exclusionary rule not applicable to parole revocation hearings).
70. "The [exclusionary] rule ... operates as 'a judicially created remedy'
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Leon, 468
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Due to the ambiguity of the Alaska Supreme Court's language
in discussing exclusion, the extent to which the privacy amendment
has directed the exclusionary rule analysis remains uncertain.
However, it is clear that the Alaska Supreme Court has been
hesitant to adopt a straight, deterrence-based cost-benefit rationale
to gauge the propriety of exclusion in circumstances involving
constitutional rights!'
Alaska courts have identified at least three justifications for the
exclusionary rule: (1) deterrence, (2) judicial integrity and (3) the
protection of individual constitutional rights.72 In Leon, the United
States Supreme Court suggested that the deterrence and individual
U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
Therefore, the Leon court sought to protect the constitutional rights of the search
victim only indirectly, that is, on a societal level through the deterrence of future
police misconduct.
71. Violations of statutes do not trigger any constitutionally protected privacy
interests. Harker v. State, 663 P.2d 932, 934 (Alaska 1983). Accordingly, Alaska
has adopted a deterrence-based cost-benefit analysis to determine the propriety of
exclusion for violations of statutes. See JR.N., 809 P.2d at 420-21; Harker, 663 P.2d
at 935 ("[T]he deterrent effect of excluding evidence [may be] outweighed by the
interest in admitting such evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act at trial .... ."); State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44, 51-52 (Alaska 1980)
(declining to apply the exclusionary rule to the violation of a forcible arrest statute).
72. See, e.g., State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943,947 (Alaska 1986) ("IThe exclusion-
ary rule reflects a balance between the interests of society in being able to use
reliable evidence ... and ... in not having its citizens' privacy unreasonably
invaded."); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1163-64 (Alaska 1985) (identifying the
"more important objective of the rule ... [to] protect an individual's personal
constitutional rights"). In Stephan, the court determined that an unexcused failure
to record electronically a custodial interrogation violated due process and mandated
exclusion of the suspect's statements. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1159. Nevertheless, the
conclusion reached in Stephan may fall outside the search-and-seizure realm.
Because Stephan involved a custodial interrogation and a resulting due process
violation, its discussion may be relevant only to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary
rule which, unlike its Fourth Amendment counterpart, has clearly been interpreted
as a personal right: "The Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination extends only to unlawfully induced testimony, not to the admission
of evidence... unlawfully obtained through an unconstitutional search." Stewart,
supra note 7, at 1381; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961) (Black, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Fourth Amendment differs from the Fifth Amendment
in that "the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any provision expressly
precluding the use of such evidence").
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rights rationales, the two rationales relevant to this note,73 are
complementary. As the Leon Court explained: "The exclusionary
rule ... operates as a 'judicially created remedy' designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect."74 Under this framework, the fact that the Alaska Constitu-
tion offers a more extensive right to privacy may have no impact on
the exclusionary rule; for if exclusion is, as Leon suggests, not
directly connected to the privacy right of the search victim, the
magnitude of that right is irrelevant.75
73. Only the deterrence and protection of individual constitutional rights ratio-
nales are relevant to this discussion. The judicial integrity rationale, which was
dismissed by the majority in Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.22, has, in Alaska, been
limited to situations of gross police misconduct. Harker, 663 P.2d at 934 n.2
(citations omitted). In Alaska, therefore, the integrity of the judiciary is implicated
only when the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence obtained by blatant police
misconduct. This is not the situation contemplated by the Leon good-faith
exception and hence is not relevant here.
74. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348
(1974)). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
The Alaska Supreme Court's discussion in Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195
(Alaska 1983), can be read to support the Leon approach. In Elson, the court held
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to sentencing hearings. The court found
deterrence to be the sole rationale for exclusion but noted that "illegal evidence is
suppressed not because it is untrustworthy... but rather because it was obtained
through an unconstitutional invasion of the defendant's rights." Id. at 1203 n.5.
However, this ambiguous statement, by itself, is not dispositive of the Alaska
Supreme Court's position on this issue. Cf. Harker, 663 P.2d at 934 (noting that
exclusion under Alaska Rule of Evidence 412 operates to deter future police
misconduct and "to breathe life into constitutional guarantees"). See infra note 82.
75. It has been suggested that the privacy clause in the Alaska Constitution
establishes an independent exclusionary rule. John F. Grossbauer, Note, Alaska's
Right to Privacy Ten Years After Ravin v. State: Developing a Jurisprudence of
Privacy, 2 ALASKA L. REv. 159, 179 n.128 (1985). According to this theory, under
an exclusionary rule based on Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, the
dissemination of illegally seized information in court could result in a constitutional
violation distinct from the search-and-seizure violation that produced such
information. Nonetheless, such a broad reading of Article I, Section 22 was
expressly rejected in Wortham v. State, 641 P.2d 223 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), affd
after remand, 657 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App.), affd, 666 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1983).
Defendant Wortham contended that the privacy amendment provided "an
independent ground for suppression ... taking the case out from under [Alaska
Rule of Evidence] 412." The court rejected this argument, noting:
[A] review of Alaska Supreme Court decisions reflects no intent to create
an independent ground of exclusion. A close reading of the cases
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However, the Alaska Supreme Court's analysis in Harker v.
State76 suggests that in Alaska, deterrence and the privacy interests
of the search victim are distinct, and not merely complementary,
rationales. In Harker, the court was asked to interpret the scope of
Alaska Rule of Evidence 412, which provides for the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence While the court recognized that the
"primary rationale behind the federal exclusionary rule is to deter
police from using unconstitutional methods of law enforcement,"78
it noted that exclusion under Rule 412 is supported by an additional
rationale: "'to breathe life into constitutional guarantees."'79 This
language echoes Justice Brennan's observation in his dissent in Leon
that exclusion "is a doctrine that gives life to the 'very heart of the
Fourth Amendment directive: that.., a governmental search and
seizure should represent both the efforts of the officers to gather
evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that
the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's
private premises."'80
Writing for the court in Harker, Justice Compton briefly
examined the rationales underlying Alaska Rule of Evidence 412.
He referred to an earlier case, State v. Sears,"1 in which Justice
Connor had characterized the predecessor to Rule 412' as "the
establishes that suppression is always predicated on [A]rt. I, [S]ection 14,
and that [A]rt. I, [S]ection 22 is merely used as a justification for giving
[S]ection 14 a liberal interpretation.
Wortham, 641 P.2d at 224 n.2 (citations omitted).
76. 663 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1983).
77. See supra note 2. The court observed that Rule 412, as a state rule of
evidence, could offer more protection than the exclusionary rule under the federal
constitution. Harker, 663 P.2d at 934.
78. Harker, 663 P.2d at 934.
79. Id. (quoting ALASKA R. EviD. 412 cmt.). The commentary to Rule 412
specifically provides that "such evidence must generally be excluded in order to
breathe life into constitutional guarantees and to remove incentives for govern-
mental intrusion into protected areas."
80. Leon, 468 U.S. at 946 (omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972)) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
81. 553 P.2d 907, 915 (Alaska 1976).
82. The predecessor, Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(g), stated:
"Evidence illegally obtained shall not be used for any purpose including the
impeachment of any witness." Harker, 663 P.2d 934 n.3.
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Alaskan expression of the constitutionally mandated exclusionary
rule."'  In Sears, Justice Connor indicated his belief that the
earlier version "necessarily operate[d] to remedy a violation of
federal Fourth Amendment fights as well as ... Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights."' Given this history, as well as the fact that
the rule serves in part to "'breathe life into constitutional guaran-
tees,"'8 there is reason to conclude that Alaska Rule of Evidence
412 is intimately connected to the privacy interests of the aggrieved
party. Although there is little evidence that this broad interpreta-
tion of Rule 412 is constitutionally mandated, it is certainly
consistent with the expansive privacy rights guaranteed by the
Alaska Constitution.
The Alaska Supreme Court has been reluctant, it seems, to
follow the course of Leon and announce a straight deterrence
rationale for the exclusionary rule. The court's language, seasoned
with invocations of privacy interests, suggests that the explicit terms
of Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution have had some
impact on the court's conception of exclusion. That this conception
remains an "unarticulated intuition"86 is merely endemic to the
nature and history of the exclusionary rule.
Other jurisdictions, however, have soundly rejected Leon on the
basis of individual privacy rights which were merely implicit in their
state constitutions. In Commonwealth v. Edmunds,r for example,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the "strong right of privacy
which inheres in Article I, Section 8" of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion to be irreconcilable with a good faith exception.' The court
"flatly reject[ed]" the notion that the exclusionary rule's sole
purpose is deterrence.8 9 In tracing the evolution of the exclusion-
ary rule, the court recognized that Pennsylvania had departed from
the path taken by the United States Supreme Court. The court
noted that approximately two decades ago, the United States
Supreme Court "began moving to a metamorphosed view" in
83. Sears, 553 P.2d at 915 (footnote omitted) (Connor, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Connor, J., dissenting).
85. See supra note 79.
86. Leon, 468 U.S. at 943 n.10 (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 901.
89. Id. at 899.
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asserting that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "'deter
future unlawful police conduct,"' rather than to "'redress the injury
to the privacy of the search victim."'" Meanwhile, Pennsylvania
"began to forge its own path... declaring with increasing frequency
that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution embodied
a strong notion of privacy, notwithstanding federal cases to the
contrary."
91
In a strong assertion of federalism, the Edmunds court
proclaimed: "Whether the United States Supreme Court has
determined that the exclusionary rule does not advance the [Fourth]
Amendment purpose of deterring police conduct is irrelevant.'
All that is significant, the court continued, "is that our [Pennsylva-
nia] Constitution has historically been interpreted to incorporate a
strong right of privacy, and an equally strong adherence to the
requirements of probable cause under Article I, Section 8. '  The
court concluded that the adoption of a good faith exception "would
virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have been
carefully developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution over the
past 200 years."'  In Pennsylvania, therefore, the exclusionary rule
90. Id. at 898 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); People v. Bigelow,
488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985). The Edmunds court also found that its adoption of
Gates created "far less [of a] reason" to follow the strictures of Leon, for "the
flexible Gates standard now eliminates much of the prior concern which existed
with respect to an overly rigid application of the exclusionary rule." Edmunds, 586
A.2d at 904 (footnote omitted). Rejecting Gates, however, does not of itself
warrant the adoption of Leon. The maintenance of the distinct Aguilar-Spinelli
prongs requires continual appellate supervision. A good faith exception will inhibit
effective appellate review, thereby allowing the two prongs to degenerate into the
"totality of the circumstances" test - which the Alaska Supreme Court has already
deemed insufficient to protect the privacy rights of Alaskans. State v. Jones, 706
P.2d 317, 324 (Alaska 1985). Therefore, because the Alaska Supreme Court has
rejected Gates, it must also reject Leon. For a discussion of the effects of adopting
both Gates and Leon, see Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith,"
and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 589 (1984) ("To impose a 'reasonable belief




remains a remedy geared to redressing the privacy invasion of the
search victim.95
Given the court's duty to "develop additional constitutional
rights ... [when it] find[s] such ... rights ... to be within the
intention and spirit" of the Alaska Constitution,96 the Alaska
Supreme Court must reject Leon or re-evaluate the purpose behind
the privacy amendment. It would be counterintuitive for a state that
expressly guarantees privacy rights to offer less protection to its
citizens than a state whose privacy rights are merely implicit in its
constitutional tradition.
IV. STATE V. JONES OVERRULED - THE PRACTICAL EFFECrs
OF ADOPTING UNITED STATES V. LEON
Practical considerations also demand that Alaska not follow
Leon. A society that places such a high premium on individual
privacy cannot allow privacy invasions to go unanswered. Yet, if
Alaska adopts Leon, the foundation supporting Alaska's strict
standard for probable cause will deteriorate, resulting in the
effective overruling of State v. Jones' and, consequently, more
frequent privacy invasions.
In order to protect privacy interests, the Alaska Supreme Court
has sought to limit magistrates' discretionary powers in the warrant
process. In Jones, the Alaska Supreme Court refused to adopt the
Gates "totality of the circumstances" test for probable cause on the
ground that such a diluted standard was inconsistent with Article I,
Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution.98 Alaska instead retained
the more structured Aguilar-Spinelli standard, with its distinct two-
prong analysis. The court indicated that only a highly structured
test like Aguilar-Spinelli could provide adequate guidance to
magistrates and assure the fewest possible privacy violations. In
an earlier case, Harrelson v. State,"° Alaska rejected United States
95. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 898. The court's conclusion also appears to be
based on a fear that Leon would undermine the probable cause standard. See id.
at 899.
96. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970).
97. 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985). See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
98. Jones, 706 P.2d at 324.
99. See id. at 322-24.
100. 516 P.2d 390 (Alaska 1973). See supra note 65.
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v. Harris,'' a United States Supreme Court case holding that a
warrant application need not state with specificity the basis of an
informant's credibility. In order to "prevent groundless searches
based on wholly unreliable information being inflicted on the
citizens of [Alaska]," the Alaska Supreme Court insisted that
magistrates continue to "set out with specificity" their reasons for
"crediting an informant's statements."'12 By requiring magistrates
to justify their decisions, the Harrelson court minimized the
subjectivity of the warrant-issuing process and ensured that a clear
record would exist to allow effective appellate review. Together,
Harrelson and Jones safeguard privacy rights; both would be
undermined by an adoption of Leon.
The Leon holding will frustrate appellate supervision of the
warrant process, leaving magistrates' probable cause determinations
virtually unchecked. While Leon encourages appellate review of
search warrants, it focuses reviewing courts on the question of good
faith, rather than on probable cause as required by the Fourth
Amendment. 3 The Leon holding itself is an example of such
misdirection. The contested search in Leon was authorized by a
warrant that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed insufficient
under both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.'O When the case
came before the United States Supreme Court, the Leon majority
recognized that it was "within [its] power to consider the question
[of] whether probable cause existed under the 'totality of circum-
stances' test announced [the previous] Term in Illinois v. Gates."'05
The Court chose instead to accept the Ninth Circuit's conclusion as
to the absence of probable cause, but reversed the court's holding
on the ground that the officers acted in good faith."°
Following Leon's lead, appellate courts have begun to uphold
"questionably descriptive warrant[s] by immediately invoking the
'good faith' rule of Leon," rather than initially deciding on the
101. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
102. Harrelson, 516 P.2d at 394-95.
103. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
104. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904 (1984). See supra note 60.
105. Id. at 905.
106. Id. at 926.
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probable cause issue." In the interest of judicial efficiency, it is
likely that more courts will begin to bypass the probable cause
inquiry for the more simplistic good faith analysis.'" Unchecked,
the probable cause standard will ultimately be weakened, for,
thereunder, magistrates "need not take much care in reviewing
warrant applications... [when] their mistakes will... have virtually
no consequence."'"
The Leon exception has been praised because it encourages the
police to seek warrants prior to executing a search."' While this
assessment may be accurate in an ideal world, in practical terms, the
already defective warrant-issuing process may further deteriorate
under the strain of an increase in warrant applications. Magistrates
usually spend between three to ten minutes assessing probable
cause."' However, a "'finding of probable cause by an experi-
enced magistrate... within two minutes after receiving the affidavit
would be neither unreasonable nor unusual.""'" Studies have
107. Hanson, supra note 19, at 534 n.578 (citing State v. Watson, 715 S.W.2d 277
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986)); see id. at 533-37 (citing more examples of situations where
courts bypassed a probable cause determination via Leon).
108. The Leon majority laid out four scenarios where an officer's reliance on the
magistrate's probable cause determination would not be considered objectively
reasonable: (1) where the magistrate is "misled by information in the affidavit that
the affiant knew... or should have known [to be] false;" (2) where the magistrate
abandons his neutral role; (3) where the affidavit is completely lacking in "indicia
of probable cause;" and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient that an
executing officer could not reasonably believe it was valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
109. Hanson, supra note 19, at 956. Also, with the possibility of exclusion all but
gone, defendants will have little incentive to make motions to suppress illegally
obtained evidence. Magistrates, therefore, will ultimately be shielded from the
watchful eyes of appellate courts and aggressive defendants.
110. The empirical verdict on Leon has yet to come in. Although the immediate
effects of Leon have been minimal, "no determination [has been] made of the
lasting effects of the ruling." Timothy S. Bynum et al., Acting in Good Faith: The
Effects of United States v. Leon on the Police and Courts, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 467,
494 (1988).
111. R. Van Duizend et al., A Review of the Search Warrant Process, STATE Cr.
J., Spring 1984, at 4, 23. The level of scrutiny that is given a warrant application
is often a function of the time of day the magistrate is approached, with late night
applications receiving the least attention. Id.
112. Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial
Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1182 n.31 (1987) (quoting Clodfelter v.
Commonwealth, 235 S.E.2d 340, 341 (Va.), rev'd on reh'g on other grounds, 238
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indicated that magistrates "tend to ask no questions and to issue
warrants in a routine fashion. 113 A summary of a recent study
reports:
Too many warrant applications were filled with "boilerplate"
language and were not fitted in detail to the situation at hand.
The "oath or affirmation" requirement rarely played a significant
role because of the large amount of hearsay or double hearsay
on the affidavits. Proceedings before the magistrate generally
lasted only two to three minutes and the magistrate rarely asked
any questions to penetrate the boilerplate language or the
hearsay in the warrant . ... [T]he police often engaged in
"magistrate shopping" for judges who would give only minimal
scrutiny to the application." 4
An increase in warrant applications, therefore, will exacerbate the
shortcomings of the warrant-issuing process. While the quantity of
warrant applications may rise, the quality of the probable cause
determinations underlying those warrants is bound to suffer.
Misdirected appellate review, meanwhile, will continue to legitimize
searches based on such warrants. The result will be more unan-
swered privacy violations and a further dilution of the probable
cause standard.
In Alaska, specifically, the probable cause standard will be
jeopardized more quickly. The maintenance of the distinct Aguilar-
Spinelli two prong test requires continual appellate supervision.
Without sufficient judicial review, the two prongs will ultimately
degenerate into the "totality of the circumstances" test - which the
Alaska Supreme Court has already deemed inadequate to protect
the privacy rights of Alaskans."'
Many courts have acknowledged the debilitating effect Leon
could have on the probable cause standard. In State v. Novem-
brino,"7 for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to
follow Leon for fear that the good faith exception "would tend to
undermine the constitutionally guaranteed standard of probable
S.E.2d 820 (Va. 1977)).
113. I& at 1182.
114. Id. at 1182-83.
115. See supra note 60.
116. State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324 (Alaska 1985). See supra notes 57-65 and
accompanying text.
117. 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987).
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cause." ' The New York Court of Appeals, meanwhile, has noted
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment rules governing police conduct have
been muddied, and judicial supervision of the warrant process
diluted" by Gates and Leon, "thus heightening the danger that our
citizens' rights against unreasonable police intrusions might be
violated.""' 9
In addition to inhibiting initial probable cause determinations
and future appellate review, the adoption of a good faith exception
will dilute the probable cause standard by altering police behavior.
Such a rule will encourage police officers to spend less time
establishing the necessary probable cause and more time shopping
for police-friendly magistrates."2 The good faith exception also
places "a premium on police ignorance of the law." '' Police
would need concern themselves only with obtaining a warrant, not
with procuring one that will stand up to appellate review.'
If Alaska is to remain true to Article I, Section 22 of the state
constitution as well as its holdings in State v. Jones and Harrelson v.
State, it must reject Leon."3 This can be accomplished even
without determining that the exclusionary rule redresses the privacy
118. Id. at 857.
119. People v. PJ. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 562 (N.Y. 1986) (commenting
on past decisions rejecting Gates and Leon).
120. State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 67 (Conn. 1990). The Leon majority dis-
counted this argument as "speculative." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918.
121. Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 125 (Vt. 1991) (citation omitted).
123. Should the Alaska Supreme Court seek to adopt Leon, it will be hard-
pressed to find cases in Alaska supporting a good faith exception. As a generic
phrase with many meanings, the language of good faith has appeared in several
appellate decisions, particularly situations involving the retroactivity of a new ruling.
In Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1971), the court wrote, "[w]e will not be
placed in the position of now declaring invalid searches which were performed in
good faith reliance upon prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court." Id.
at 279; see also Unger v. State, 640 P.2d 151, 156 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(applying Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) retroactively only to the
defendants in the case, thus the court did not have to reach the good faith issue).
But as Kamisar warns, "[a] proponent of the 'good faith' or 'reasonable belief' test"
should not use "some of the very difficult but relatively rare situations that arise in
the retroactivity/prospectivity cases as 'loss leaders' to attract support for a




violation. 24  In State v. Marsala, 5 the Connecticut Supreme
Court rejected Leon by attacking the Leon Court's reasoning, but
not its basic premise that deterrence is the sole benefit of exclusion.
The court argued that the exclusionary rule does have a deterrent
effect even when an officer relies in good faith because the
exclusionary rule is not just directed at police misconduct, but also
at the "warrant-issuing process."'126 The court also found the costs
of exclusion resulting from good faith error to be minimal.27 If
Alaska rejects Leon based on these arguments, the practical result
will be the same as if it were to adopt the compensatory rationale
for exclusion: deficiencies in probable cause would not be shielded
by an officer's good faith.
However, unless Alaska attacks the basic premise of Leon, the
court will be conceding precious constitutional ground. Alaska will
be sanctioning a constitutional theory which divorces exclusion from
the privacy right - a concept that is inimical to Article I, Section
22 of the Alaska Constitution. Under a deterrence-based exclusion-
ary rule, privacy invasions are not remedied for the sake of the
individual, but for the sake of society, leaving the search victim
without a personal remedy for the violation of his privacy rights.
The suppression of incriminating evidence is confined to the status
of a windfall, given as a matter of governmental sufferance. Such
treatment minimizes the value of individual privacy rights and
contradicts the language of the Alaska Constitution: "The right of
the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."'"
124. Several state courts have done so. E.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58
(Conn. 1990). A portion of Justice Brennan's dissent in Leon, moreover,
persuasively challenges the Court's analysis without straying from the Court's
.general approach." Leon, 468 U.S. at 948 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990).
126. Id. at 66. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. ALASKA CoNsT. art I, § 22; see also Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d
386, 394 (Alaska 1970) ("The American constitutional theory is that constitutions
are a restraining force against the abuse of governmental power, not that individual




In United States v. Calandra,129 the United States Supreme
Court resolved the debate over the constitutional basis and function
of the federal exclusionary rule. As a "judicially created remedy"
designed "to deter future unlawful police conduct" and not "to
redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim," the triggering
of the federal exclusionary rule became contingent on the outcome
of a cost-benefit analysis."3° That individual privacy rights van-
ished from the equation did not seem to trouble the United States
Supreme Court, but proved unsettling to many of the states. At
least one state court has noted that its exclusionary rule is "not
suited to such a simplistic resolution of the issue."'31 As Justice
Brennan explained in his dissent in United States v. Leon, "[the]
balancing of deterrent benefits and costs is an 'inquiry [that] can
never be performed in an adequate way and the reality is thus that
the decision must rest not upon these grounds, but upon prior
dispositions or unarticulated intuitions that are never justified.""' 32
Nevertheless, the cost-benefit paradigm has become the accepted
means, even in Alaska, for gauging the propriety of exclusion. The
Rule and the Right can still be re-united, however, if state courts
recognize that exclusion can redress the privacy violation. To some,
such as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,33 this realization is a
matter of intuition; but to Alaska, in light of Article I, Section 22,
it is a matter of Constitution.
Jeremy S. Simon
129. 414 U.S. 338 (1973).
130. Id. at 347-48.
131. State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 561 (N.C. 1988).
132. Leon, 468 U.S. at 943 n.10 (quoting James Boyd White, Forgotten Points
in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 1273, 1281-82 (1983))
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
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